# PEACE OF MIND IN A DANGEROUS WORLD

Wednesday, June 8, 2022 I 6:00 EET

The Role of Elliptic Curve Cryptography in the Post-Quantum Era Webinar series Cryptography under the hood

Speaker **Kimmo Järvinen** 

CTO & Co-founder, Xiphera



### Agenda

I. Introduction to ECCII. Implementation pitfallsIII. Secure ECC implementationsIV. ECC in the PQ era

# What is an elliptic curve?

The basis of **ECC** security

Scalar multiplication: The basic operation of every ECC system





- Since the mid-1980s: Miller and Koblitz
- Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems: The most widely used asymmetric cryptography algorithms in today's systems
- Key Exchange and Digital Signatures: ECDH(E), ECDSA (X25519, EdDSA)



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This toy example: 23 points

incl. point at infinity (5-bit prime)



#### In practice:

NIST P-384 has 3940200619639447... 9212279040100143... 6138050797392704... 6544666794690527... 9627659399113263... 5693989563081522... 9491355443365394... 2643 points incl. point at infinity (384-bit prime)

This toy example: G = (0, 1)



#### In practice:

NIST P-384 base point: G = (262470350957996892686... 2315674456698189185292... 3491109213387815615900... 9255188547380500890223... 8805397571978665087247... 6732087, 8325710961489029985546... 7512895201081792878530... 4886131559470920590248... 0503199884419224438643... 7603929473330780865116... 27871)





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### **Scalar Multiplication**

- The most important operation in ECC Q = kP
  - Q and P are points
  - k is an integer and must typically be secret (for example, the private key)

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- The most important operation in ECC Q = kP
  - Q and P are points
  - k is an integer and must typically be secret (for example, the private key)
- Fast algorithms are available
  - For example: Compute 20G by computing G+G, 2G+2G, 4G+4G, 8G+8G and 16G+4G (only 5 additions)



# **Discrete Logarithm Problem**



# **Discrete Logarithm Problem**

This toy example: The answer is 17G



In practice: Impossible to solve Security levels: P-256 : 128-bit P-384 : 192-bit P-521 : 256-bit Curve25519 : 128-bit

Curve448 : 224-bit

### Pitfalls

Invalid curve attacks

Three examples of what can go wrong

Lack of proper input checks

Nonce re-use Operation patterns

Side-channels

Timing

- The hash *h* of a message is signed with signing key *d* as follows:
  - The nonce k is a cryptographically random integer in interval [1,n-1]

$$r \leftarrow [kG]_{x}$$

$$s \leftarrow \frac{h+r \cdot d}{k} \mod n$$

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- Sony PS3 was broken in 2010 (fixed k)
- Bitcoin hack in 2012 (bad RNG in Java SecureRandom in Android)

# **ECDH: Invalid Curve Attacks**

- Often the other party selects the input point P
- An attacker sends *P* that is a point on *a weak curve instead of the correct curve* and gets information about the victim's private key
- **CVE-2015-2613:** Static private key of TLS-ECDH in a Bouncy Castle server after 3000 handshakes
- Check that the point is on the curve!



# **ECDSA: Proper Input Checks**

• ECDSA signature verification:

I) Check that r and s are integers in the interval [1,n-1]

2) Using signer's public key *P* compute

$$R \leftarrow \left(\frac{h}{s}\right) G + \left(\frac{r}{s}\right) P$$

3) Accept signature if and only if  $r = [R]_x$ 

- CVE-2022-21449 (Apr. 19, 2022):
  - Java ECDSA skips Step I) and accepts (r,s) = (0,0) on any message

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### **Side Channels**

Side channel attacks use information *leaked by the implementation* of a cryptosystem to break the security.

Computation **Electromagnetic** Acoustic, radiation optical, ... timing Micro-Instantaneous architectural power features consumption (e.g. cache) Xiphera Ltd. – Cryptography under the hood

### **Our Products**

- Xiphera's ECC portfolio
  - Compact IP cores
  - X25519/Ed25519
  - New IP cores:
    - ECDH/ECDSA on P-256/384
- Secure designs
  - All relevant checks
  - Constant time / operation patterns



### The Future of ECC

ECC could be broken with a large-scale quantum computer.

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PQC

Hybrid schemes: PQC + ECC Elliptic curve based PQC

# Why Hybrid Systems?

- We cannot fully trust that the new PQC schemes are secure
  - Example: NIST finalist Rainbow was broken!
- Many recommend using a hybrid system
  - ANSSI (France) recommends it at least until 2030
- ECC will not go away for a long time!





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### Key Take-Away

Secure cryptosystem (ECC/PQC)

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Secure implementation

### Key Take-Away

Secure cryptosystem (ECC/PQC)

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# Secure implementation

A system is secure *only* if it is here!

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More info coming soon.

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