



Webinar series
**Cryptography
under the hood**

Wednesday, March 9, 2022

16:00 EET

**State of Play of
Post Quantum
Cryptography**

Speaker

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Definitions

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC)

Cryptography which cannot be “broken” by quantum computers.

Quantum computing

Computation using quantum phenomena.

Quantum cryptography

Exploits quantum mechanical phenomena for cryptographic tasks.

Public-key (asymmetric) cryptography

Algorithms used in key exchange and digital signatures.

Secret-key (symmetric) cryptography

Algorithms used in encrypting and decrypting “bulk” traffic.

Effective key length

Achieved security level, not necessarily the same as key length.



Quantum Computers

- Computation based on quantum phenomena:
 - Super-position
 - Entanglement
- Qubits = “Quantum bits”
 - IBM: 127 qubits (Nov. 2021)
- “Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC)”

The Quantum Threat



Peter Shor speaking after receiving the 2017 Dirac Medal from the ICTP.
Author: International Centre for Theoretical Physics
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j7HeDX_7Heg&t=7075

- In 1994 Peter Shor introduced **Shor's algorithm**
 - A *polynomial-time* algorithm for solving integer factoring and (elliptic curve) discrete logarithms
- Shor's algorithm will break RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography if *CRQCs become practical*
 - Practically all Internet security relies on RSA/ECC
 - This is likely the biggest threat to contemporary cryptosystems
- Lesser concern: **Grover's algorithm** (1996)
 - Requires doubling the key length in symmetric cryptography to maintain the same security level (e.g. AES128 \Rightarrow AES256)

The Imminent Quantum Threat

**“Record today,
break tomorrow.”**



NIST PQC Competition



NIST PQC Finalists

Cryptotypes:

Structured lattices

Codes

Multivariate

Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEM)

Classic McEliece

CRYSTALS-KYBER

NTRU

Saber

KeyGen() \rightarrow (pk, sk)
Encapsulate(pk) \rightarrow (ct, ss)
Decapsulate(pk, sk, ct) \rightarrow (ss)

Signature schemes


CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM

FALCON

Rainbow

KeyGen() \rightarrow (pk, sk)
Sign(sk, msg) \rightarrow (sig)
Verify(sig, msg, pk) \rightarrow (msg)

Example: CRYSTALS-KYBER



Algorithm 5 KYBER.CPAPKE.Enc(pk, m, r): encryption

Input: Public key $pk \in \mathcal{B}^{12 \cdot k \cdot n / 8 + 32}$

Input: Message $m \in \mathcal{B}^{32}$

Input: Random coins $r \in \mathcal{B}^{32}$

Output: Ciphertext $c \in \mathcal{B}^{d_u \cdot k \cdot n / 8 + d_v \cdot n / 8}$

```

1:  $N := 0$ 
2:  $\hat{t} := \text{Decode}_{12}(pk)$ 
3:  $\rho := pk + 12 \cdot k \cdot n / 8$ 
4: for  $i$  from 0 to  $k - 1$  do
5:   for  $j$  from 0 to  $k - 1$  do
6:      $\hat{A}^T[i][j] := \text{Parse}(\text{XOF}(\rho, i, j))$ 
7:   end for
8: end for
9: for  $i$  from 0 to  $k - 1$  do
10:   $r[i] := \text{CBD}_{\eta_1}(\text{PRF}(r, N))$ 
11:   $N := N + 1$ 
12: end for
13: for  $i$  from 0 to  $k - 1$  do
14:   $e_1[i] := \text{CBD}_{\eta_2}(\text{PRF}(r, N))$ 
15:   $N := N + 1$ 
16: end for
17:  $e_2 := \text{CBD}_{\eta_2}(\text{PRF}(r, N))$ 
18:  $\hat{r} := \text{NTT}(r)$ 
19:  $u := \text{NTT}^{-1}(\hat{A}^T \circ \hat{r}) + e_1$ 
20:  $v := \text{NTT}^{-1}(\hat{t}^T \circ \hat{r}) + e_2 + \text{Decompress}_q(\text{Decode}_1(m), 1)$ 
21:  $c_1 := \text{Encode}_{d_u}(\text{Compress}_q(u, d_u))$ 
22:  $c_2 := \text{Encode}_{d_v}(\text{Compress}_q(v, d_v))$ 
23: return  $c = (c_1 || c_2)$ 

```

Algorithm 6 KYBER.CPAPKE.Dec(sk, c): decryption

Input: Secret key $sk \in \mathcal{B}^{12 \cdot k \cdot n / 8}$

Input: Ciphertext $c \in \mathcal{B}^{d_u \cdot k \cdot n / 8 + d_v \cdot n / 8}$

Output: Message $m \in \mathcal{B}^{32}$

```

1:  $u := \text{Decompress}_q(\text{Decode}_{d_u}(c), d_u)$ 
2:  $v := \text{Decompress}_q(\text{Decode}_{d_v}(c + d_u \cdot k \cdot n / 8), d_v)$ 
3:  $\hat{s} := \text{Decode}_{12}(sk)$ 
4:  $m := \text{Encode}_1(\text{Compress}_q(v - \text{NTT}^{-1}(\hat{s}^T \circ \text{NTT}(u)), 1))$ 
5: return  $m$ 

```

CRYSTALS-KYBER

Main operations are

- Number Theoretic Transform (NTT)
- Polynomial arithmetic
- Samplings from Centered Binomial Distributions (CBD)
- SHA-3/SHAKE computations (PRF, XOF)

PQC vs. current algorithm differences



- PQC key lengths significantly longer
- Latency examples
 - KYBER ja SABER generally slightly faster than current ECC
 - Classic McEliece likely fastest of all
 - For example, SIKE is slow

KEMs: Key and Ciphertext Sizes (in bytes)

Algorithm	Status	Security	Private key	Public key
ECC	Pre-Quantum	1	32	32
		5	64	64
Classic McEliece	Finalist	1	6492	261120
		5	13932	1044992
Kyber	Finalist	1	1632	800
		5	3168	1568
NTRU	Finalist	1	935	699
		5	1590	1230
Saber	Finalist	1	1568	672
		5	3040	1312
SIKE	Alternate	1	374	330
		5	644	564

Recommendations

- Government agencies have given recommendations
 - BSI (Germany):
 - Classic McEliece or FrodoKEM (NIST alternate, lattice scheme)
 - ANSSI (France):
 - Post-quantum defense-in-depth as soon as possible for products requiring a long-lasting protection of information
 - FrodoKEM, Kyber, Dilithium or Falcon
- Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3 (draft IETF)
- Multiple key exchanges in IKEv2 (draft IETF)
- “hybridation” = co-existence of PQC and ECC/RSA



Key Take-aways

Systems designed today should have the ability to support PQC in the future.

Co-existence of classical and PQC algorithms.

Reprogrammability of FPGA is an advantage.

Fixed solutions (ASIC, TPM) lack crypto agility.

2-3 years from algorithms to standards.

Quantum Cryptography for niche applications.



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Thank you!

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Appendix

- <https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/publication/anssi-views-on-the-post-quantum-cryptography-transition/>
- https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Publikationen/Studien/Quantencomputer/P283_QC_Studie-V_1_2.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1
- <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/whitepaper/preparing-for-quantum-safe-cryptography>
- Quantum computers
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